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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES D. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. ' 
GOLD'S GYM and TROY PETERSON 
& ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
CaseNo.20010510-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
If the property was not ready for occupancy on August 18 nor on November 1,1997, 
as argued in paragraph 6 of Peterson's statement of facts, it was only because Peterson had 
not installed the improvements necessary to make the property ready for occupancy. The 
contractor and Nielsen both testified that Peterson could have begun installing the tenant 
improvements prior to November 1, the possession date under the lease. Tr. 37, 39, 80-81. 
Paragraph 9 of Peterson's statement of facts notes that Nielsen never gave Peterson 
written notice that he could take possession of the premises. This statement is obviously 
included only for its supposed pejorative effect, for it is not mentioned in the argument and 
is completely irrelevant to any issue on appeal. What Peterson fails to note is that there was 
no requirement that Nielsen give any notice, and certainly no requirement of written notice. 
Even though he was not required to do so, Nielsen did give oral notice to Peterson that 
Peterson could start building his interior improvements. Tr. 39-40. 
Paragraph 10, which correctly states there were some blanks in the contract, also 
seems to be included only to improperly prejudice this Court. Peterson states "Nielsen failed 
to fill in the blanks" on various portions of the contract. The fact is that Peterson also failed 
to fill in those blanks before he signed the contract. Clarifying the time deadlines for 
Peterson to terminate the lease was as much Peterson's responsibility as Nielsen's, if not 
more so. The same is true of the other blanks not filled in. Peterson does not claim that the 
blanks in the lease invalidated the lease, nor could he support such an argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A CONTRACT 
PROVISION IS AMBIGUOUS IS A QUESTION OF LAW 
THAT IS REVIEWED FOR CORRECTNESS, WITH NO 
DEFERENCE BEING GIVEN TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION. 
Peterson first errs in arguing that the standard of review is the clearly erroneous 
standard of review. See Peterson's Brief pp. 2, 12. As has been made clear on multiple 
occasions, appellate review of a trial court's conclusion of contractual ambiguity is under the 
non-deferential correctness standard. See, e.g., Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. 
Crook, 980 P.2d 685, 687 (Utah 1999) (holding that findings of contractual ambiguity, 
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including those in which the contract was found to have "multiple meanings" are reviewed 
for correctness). 
Peterson relies on language from Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), and Bell v. Elder. 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), to suggest that the 
review in this case should proceed under the clearly erroneous standard. In doing so, 
Peterson misinterprets the applicable law. The cited language from Barnes and Bell simply 
stands for the proposition that, when an appellate court is reviewing a trial court's 
examination of the parties' respective intent, that review is a necessarily factual one that is 
reviewed under the deferential standard. See Barnes, 750 P.2d at 1229. What Peterson's 
characterization of this holding fails to appreciate is that the review of a question of 
contractual ambiguity is a bifurcated review. The examining court only reaches the factual 
question of intent after it has determined that the trial court was correct in its initial 
conclusion of contractual ambiguity. This distinction is made clear in Wilburn v. Interstate 
Electric, 748 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the very case that Barnes relied on for support 
of its standard of review holding. See Barnes, 750 P.2d at 1229. 
In Wilburn, the court noted that in an appeal of a finding of contractual ambiguity, the 
appellate court must first undertake its own review of whether the contract was actually 
ambiguous. Wilburn, 748 P.2d at 585 (holding that "we must first determine, as a matter of 
law, whether the contract is ambiguous"). This initial inquiry is done under the non-
deferential correctness standard. See kL at 584. It is only if the appellate court first finds 
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ambiguity that the factual, extrinsic evidence-based question of the parties' intent is 
appropriately addressed by the court. See idL at 585. As a review of fact, it is only this 
subsequent inquiry that receives the deferential, clearly erroneous review. See Wilburn. 748 
P.2dat585. 
The bifurcated nature of the contractual ambiguity review has been discussed and 
applied in a variety of settings, perhaps most clearly in Judge Orme's concurrence in 
Seashores v. Hancey:1 
I wish to make clear . . . that the threshold question of whether 
or not the contract is ambiguous is itself a question of law. 
Thus, we must conclude, as a matter of law, that the contract is 
ambiguous before we go to the next step, namely that of 
evaluating the facts found under the restrictive and deferential 
standard by which factual findings are received.. 
Seashores v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Orme, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added, citations omitted). 
In Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, the trial court found ambiguity in a contract and thus 
resorted to an extrinsic evidence-based analysis. The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that 
the threshold question of whether or not a writing is ambiguous 
is a question of law for a court to decide. This initial decision 
does not require resort to extrinsic evidence and thus we accord 
the trial court's interpretation no presumption of correctness, but 
review the trial court's action under a correction of error 
standard. 
790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). 
importantly, the Wilburn court relied upon Seashore for its understanding of the doctrine. 
See Wilburn. 748 P.2d at 585. 
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Similarly, in D'Aston v. D'Aston, wherein the trial court had also found ambiguity 
and had also resorted to an extrinsic evidence-based analysis of intent, the Court of Appeals 
again gave no deference in its review, noting that "the threshold determination of whether 
a writing is ambiguous is a question of law" which is reviewed with "no particular deference 
to the trial court." 808 P.2d 111,114-115 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). As with 
Whitehouse, the D 'Aston court reversed the trial court on the basis of this initial, "threshold" 
legal question of ambiguity, thus obviating the need for any discussion of the trial court's 
additional, extrinsic evidence based findings of fact. See id 
In the context of the present appeal, it is therefore important to stress the specific 
nature of Nielsen's claim. Nielsen's appeal in this case is not centered on the factual 
question of the parties' respective intents in forming the contract. Instead, Nielsen's appeal 
is based solely on the grounds that the contract itself was clear and unambiguous and should 
therefore be enforced. Given the bifurcated nature of this inquiry, it is clear that the issue 
before this Court concerns the first prong of the analysis-whether the contract was actually 
ambiguous-and therefore presents a pure question of law to be reviewed without any 
deference to the trial court's decision.2 
2Given this distinction, Peterson's contentions that there are marshaling problems with 
Nielsen's brief are also without merit. The marshaling requirement only applies to "(a) party 
challenging a fact finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Because this appeal is based solely 
on a question of law, there is no need to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
factual findings. 
5 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE CONTRACT WAS AMBIGUOUS. 
Peterson also errs in continuing to insist that the term "premise" is ambiguous. As 
described in Peterson's brief, this supposed ambiguity initially arises from the fact that there 
are "up to seven plausible meanings" for the term "premise." Peterson's Brief at 11. In 
looking at the listed meanings, however, it becomes clear that the "ambiguities" complained 
of in the brief in fact have nothing to do with Peterson's decision to breach the contract. Of 
the seven meanings of the term "premise" that Peterson has identified, the first five simply 
refer to the number of square feet available in the building,3 while the sixth simply refers to 
the "shell" of the building itself. Importantly, the dispute leading to Peterson's decision to 
breach had nothing to do with any conflict over the size of the building, but rather had to do 
with who would pay for any improvements to the building. At no point in the record below 
is there any mention of Peterson complaining of insufficient space. As a threshold matter, 
it is therefore important to note that Peterson's list of supposed ambiguities is therefore 
meaningless as to the true nature of his decision to breach. 
3This claim that there is some uncertainty in the square footage leased is raised for the 
first time on appeal. There was no hint at trial of any disagreement concerning the area 
leased. Peterson employed an architect to design interior improvements (Tr. 76), and met 
him at the strip mall site to explain what improvements he wanted. (Tr. 74.) It was clear to 
Peterson at that time just what he was leasing. The trial court found that Peterson later 
leased "the subject premises" to another tenant, again with no uncertainty concerning the size 
of "the subject premises." R. 145 U 12. Had Peterson raised this claim at trial, therefore, the 
judge would have had no difficulty determining the precise area under lease. It simply was 
not a disputed issue. 
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It is in the seventh listed meaning of the word "premise"-that of premise possibly 
meaning "a finished building"-that the crux of this dispute actually lies. Peterson's Brief at 
11. The trial court based its support for Peterson's decision to breach on the fact that the 
term "premise" was supposedly ambiguous because it could be read to encompass any future 
improvements needed to successfully operate a gym. Peterson makes much of this 
possibility in his brief, noting this Court's holding in Whitehouse that "language in a written 
document is ambiguous if the words used may be understood to support two or more 
plausible meanings." Peterson's Brief at 11 (citing Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 60). Thus, 
Peterson argues that the fact that he might have understood "premise" to require undefined 
future improvements renders the contract ambiguous. 
The isolated reference to the language in Whitehouse is misleading, for it fails to 
recognize the point made by that very Court just one sentence later, namely that "the mere 
fact that the parties interpret the language differently does not, per se, render the writing 
ambiguous." Id, (emphases added). Instead, the principle is clear that, because the 
threshold question of ambiguity is a question of law, it is for the court to determine whether 
the language is ambiguous from the terms of the contract, not from the stated opinions of the 
parties themselves. See 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 337 (1991) ("if the language of the 
contract is plain and unambiguous, the intention expressed and indicated thereby controls, 
rather than whatever may be claimed to have been the actual intention of the parties"); 17A 
Am. Jur. 2d Contracts. § 338 (1991) ("a contract is not rendered ambiguous simply because 
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the parties do not agree on its proper construction or their intent upon executing the 
contract1'). 
In the present case, the district court thus erred in its holding of ambiguity because 
its holding appears to have had no grounding in the actual text of the lease. Instead of basing 
its conclusion of ambiguity on what the lease does say, the district court's holding of 
ambiguity seems entirely based on what the lease supposedly doesn 't say about the concept 
of improvements vis a vis the concept of what constitutes the "premises". See R. at 115; 
accord Peterson's Brief at 8-9 (noting that "the lease was completely silent regarding the duty 
to install and pay for interior improvements"). There are two problems with this approach. 
First, the lease is not silent on the subject of improvements. Clause 4 of the lease 
agreement explicitly states that "Lessee shall not, without first obtaining the written consent 
of Lessor, make any alterations, additions, or improvements, in, to or about the premises." 
Clause 3 specifies that the tenant is responsible to maintain any improvements which are 
installed by the landlord. While the lease does not explicitly state that the leased premises 
were the premises as they existed on the date of possession, it is more logical to assume that 
omission was intentional. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1187 
(Utah 1996) (where legislature used a particular term in other provisions, its omission in the 
provision at issue was intentional, not inadvertent). Where the lease provided a mechanism 
for Peterson to install improvements, the effect of this language is to place the responsibility 
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for making any improvements to the premises on Peterson, subject only to the consent of 
Nielsen. Thus, the supposed "silence" on this question actually doesn't exist.4 
Second, the import of the trial court's finding is ultimately that silence itself creates 
ambiguity. Thus, in the present case, the contractual silence regarding future improvements 
that had not yet been designed, appraised, or otherwise agreed upon, is somehow deemed 
enough to render the whole contract "ambiguous." The principle that silence regarding an 
undefined non-entity is sufficient to render the defined terms of a contract ambiguous simply 
cannot be countenanced under our laws without provoking serious ramifications. If 
accepted, this principle would serve as a means for any disaffected party to challenge the 
validity of any contract based on nothing more concrete than the fact that the contract didn't 
address some potentially important issue. This argument simply fails to appreciate the fact 
that, in the give and take bargaining process that constitutes contractual negotiations, silence 
itself can be a desired and bargained for consideration. For example, a couple selling a 
house with an unfinished basement might accept a lower price rather than having to complete 
the project themselves before sale, but it would not be expected that the contract would 
importantly, the terms "improvements" and "premises" are used within the same clause 
of the lease to refer to different concepts. See Br. of Appellant, Addendum D, Clause 4 
(stating that "Lessee shall no t . . . make any alterations, additions, or improvements, in, to 
or about the premises") (emphasis added). This clearly indicates that, according to the bare 
terms of the contract, "premises" is a distinct concept from "improvements." Any questions 
of whether the lease of the "premises" is ambiguous due to the word's possible inclusion of 
"improvements" is obviated by the fact that the lease itself treats the concepts as distinct and 
defmitionally separate. 
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allocate the responsibility for finishing the basement. It is an unmistakable fact of commerce 
that goods and properties of all varieties are routinely sold in either unfinished conditions or 
with the possibility of radical and substantial possibilities of future improvement. The trial 
court's holding in this case seems to indicate that any such contract is rendered ambiguous 
by virtue of the silence on the issue of any potentially important improvements. Thus, in the 
example above, the buyers of the home might try to escape the duties of the signed mortgage 
based on the higher than expected price estimates of the contractor. 
In the present case, it is therefore important to note that even Peterson stresses in his 
brief that the parties had no official "meeting of the minds" as to the issue of who would pay 
for the undefined improvements at the time that he signed the lease. See Peterson's Brief at 
9. In spite of this failure to agree on these terms, however, the trial court found that Peterson 
nevertheless signed an otherwise valid lease agreement and then proceeded to act as if "even 
he believed that a deal had been reached." R. at 117.5 If Peterson believed installation of 
improvements should be a precondition for the lease, then he was certainly free to attach this 
provision to the lease agreement as an addendum (much in the same way that the parties to 
attached an addendum qualifying the viability of the lease upon a successful zoning change). 
5Peterson testified at trial: 
Q. [by Don Petersen] Now, by signing Exhibit 1 it was 
your intent, was it not, to lease premises in Spanish Fork from 
Mr. Nielsen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is what you intended to do? 
A. Exactly. 
Tr. 121. 
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Peterson could even have penciled in such a notation onto the form itself. He did not do this. 
Instead, he signed the lease and proceeded to act as if it was in force. The failure to achieve 
a "meeting of the minds" regarding the future improvements therefore does not in any way 
relate to the lease itself, but rather to a subsequent request that would need to be negotiated, 
contracted for, and perhaps grafted onto the original lease at a future time. 
Thus, though the trial court based its holding on a finding of "premises"-might-equal-
"improvements" ambiguity, the entirety of its supporting reasoning addresses an entirely 
separate topic. Instead of attempting to show how, where, or why the term "premises" has 
been or could be interpreted to mean "improvements," the court instead focused its reasoning 
on a substantive piece of silence found in this particular deal. Silence regarding topic B does 
not render ambiguous a word used to describe topic A. 
It is the province of this court to determine whether, as a matter of law, the term 
"premises" in real estate contracts can be confused with the term "improvements." It is clear 
from the terms of this contract that "premise" does not mean "improvements." This Court 
should reverse the lower court's holding of ambiguity, and rule that this contract was valid 
and enforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents a question of law concerning whether a contract is ambiguous. The 
standard of review is "correctness." The contract's failure to expressly disavow any 
requirement that Nielsen install improvements does not make the contract ambiguous. The 
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trial court's conclusion that there was no contract should be reversed. Because Peterson 
never contradicted the damages claimed by Nielsen, the case should be remanded with 
instructions to enter judgment for Nielsen for the damages proved at trial. 
DATED this _£^day of June, 2002. 
DON R. PETERSEN and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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